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We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and
agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are
determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want to
give strongest explicit incentives for agents far from retirement to account for the
fact that career concerns might induce behavior in conflict with the principal’s
preferences. Furthermore, we show that maximized welfare might be decreasing
in the strength of the career concerns, that optimal incentives can be positively
correlated with various measures of uncertainty, and that career incentives have
strong implications for optimal job design.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study optimal incentive contracts in government agen-
cies. These organizations are characterized by limited commitments between principals
and agents, by agents that have multiple tasks and career concerns, and by principals
pursuing goals that, unlike financial objectives, are too complex to be summarized in
one aggregate performance measure which can be rewarded directly. According to De-
watripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a) these observations, and especially the last one,
will imply that govenmental agencies may operate more or less on a fixed budget, and
that career concerns are paramount in prodding oﬃcials to pursue the agencies’ goals
(p. 201). Furthermore, and as emphasized by Wilson (1989), government agencies in-
variably employ professionals whose career concerns are at least partly determined by
their professional environment.
In recent years there has however been a trend towards more extensive use of mon-
etary incentives in governmental agencies. Specialized health care in many OECD-
countries is a prominent example where monetary incentives are introduced, e.g. through
prospective payment systems1. Individual performance pay is also adopted within hos-
pitals as a means to improve performance. For example, the Detroit-based Sullivan,
Cotter and Associates Inc., which tracks not-for-profit health care organizations found
that 69% of institutions, most of them hospitals and medical centers, in 2000 oﬀered
some type of incentive plan. In addition, 74% of the responding institutions that collect
physician performance-data, base salary or salary increases on individual performance
(Sullivan, Cotter and Associates, 2001).2 Hence, explicit economic incentives have come
to play an importantl role in the design of incentive schemes.
A question that naturally arises is then how the interplay between monetary incen-
tives and professional career concerns aﬀects individual behavior, and thereby aﬀects
the possibility of an organization to achieve its goals. More specifically, how can the
management of a governmental agency, by oﬀering agents monetary incentive contracts,
induce behavior consistent with its preference?. What does the optimal incentive scheme
look like in the presence of professional career concerns, what are the implications for
job design, and what are the implications for welfare? These are the questions we ad-
dress in this paper. To do so we put forward a simple dynamic multitask career concern
model with monetary incentives. To emphasize the observations mentioned above we as-
sume that the principal’s gross benefit cannot be rewarded directly, and that the agent’s
career concerns are determined by the professional environment. We also assume that
commitment to long-term contracts is limited.
The following example illustrates the type of situations we have in mind. Consider
a physician’s choice between treating more patients or spending more time on fewer
patients within a fixed time-budget. Both types of actions will typically improve patients’
health status, and thus contribute to the hospital management’s (the principal’s) gross
benefit. An aggregate performance signal on the improvement in patients’ health status
1These payment systems essentially pay a fixed ”price” per discharge, with the price being determined
by the patient’s descharge diagnosis (diagnosis related groups, or DRG).
2See also Marsden and Frence (1998).
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will however, typically not be available. As a result management must base incentive
contracts on alternative performance measures, e.g. the number of patients treated.
But there often exist additional observable, although not verifiable, signals that reveal
information about the agent’s eﬀort, such as measures of the quality of the treatment
given. Such signals are typically not verifiable since it is too costly to specify ex ante
the quality aspects of treatment in terms that can be verified ex post by a third party.
On the other hand, the quality of the given treatment provides some information about
the physician’s ability to both the inside principal and outside hospitals (or the outside
market) through professional networks, and hence, there are career incentives related to
such signals.3
The general conclusion we obtain is that the optimal incentive scheme must balance
professional career concerns in two ways. Firstly, monetary incentives must balance
career incentives on the task which can be economically rewarded. Secondly, monetary
incentives must balance how the agent should divide his/her eﬀort among the tasks.
This general conclusion is rather intuitive, but the optimal incentive scheme we derive
has many implications that we believe give contributions both to our understanding of
the public sector, and to the theory of incentives. We now describe these implications,
and the relevant literature, in more detail.
The first observation we make is that the optimal incentive scheme may be strongest
earliest in agents’ careers. This result resembles the fact often observed in government
agencies where subordinates get paid overtime, while more senior oﬃcers are paid a fixed
salary. In the theory of incentives it is however often argued that optimal incentives are
increasing over time if agents have career concerns.4 This result was put forward by Gib-
bons and Murphy (1992) who showed that an optimal compensation contract optimizes
the combination of monetary and career incentives. And as career incentives decrease
over time, it is necessary to boost monetary incentives for agents close to retirement
to induce a certain eﬀort level. The key to understand why their result is at variance
with ours is to note that Gibbons and Murphy (1992) modelled incentive contracts in
situations where there exists an aggregate contractible measure of the principal’s gross
benefits.5 When such an aggregate measure exists, the division of eﬀort between dif-
ferent tasks can be delegated to the agent. Technically this is equivalent to modelling
agents that only exert eﬀort on one task, as Gibbons and Murphy do. This implies that
monetary incentives and career concern incentives become substitutes in their frame-
work; higher career concerns reduce the required monetary incentives needed to induce
a certain eﬀort level. Since career concerns are strongest earliest in agents’ careers, the
3See e.g. Le Grand (1999), Grout, Jenkin, and Propper (2000), Croxson, Propper, and Perkins
(2001) and Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001) for evidence that physisians’ behavior are driven by
both career concerns and monetary incentives.
4The fact that career concerns is a means to provide incentives for exerting eﬀort was first discussed
by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982). Fama (1980) argued that incentive contracts are not necessary
since agents are disciplined by career concerns, while Holmstrom (1982) showed that career concern
incentives are not suﬃcient to induce eﬃcient eﬀort. Building on this fact, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
added explicit contracts to the Fama-Holmström model.
5Specifically they examined the relationship between chief executive compensations and stock market
performance.
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required monetary incentives needed to induce a certain eﬀort level are lower for agents
far from retirement.
We do however believe that such aggregate performance measures are not available in
many governmental organizations, e.g. in health care. Hence, it is more problematic for
(health care) principals to let agents determine for themselves how to split eﬀort between
tasks. In these organizations, monetary incentives must be set not only in response to
career incentives on a single task, but also to serve the function of balancing the agent’s
eﬀort between tasks. As a result monetary incentives and career concern incentives are
complements between the tasks. That is, higher career concerns (on one task) imply
higher monetary incentives on other tasks to induce the same split of eﬀorts between the
tasks.
It has been pointed out that a complementarity eﬀect between monetary and career
incentives may arise for another reason, namley.when there is technological complemen-
tarity between eﬀort and talent in the way they aﬀect performance. Dewatripont, Jewitt,
and Tirole (1999b) show that a complementarity eﬀect may arise in the single-task case
if the eﬀort structure is multiplicative in this way. In this case these authors show that
multiplicity of equilibria can arise: market expectations about high or low eﬀort can
be self-fulfilling. In addition Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b) show that com-
plementarity eﬀects between these two types of incentives may arise such that raising
monetary incentives may increase career incentives either locally around a certain equi-
librium or globally to aﬀect the set of equilibria. Note, however that these results do not
hold when they consider an additive eﬀort structure (as in the model presented here).6
Furthermore, the main focus in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b) is on career
incentives, and not on the interplay between monetary incentives and career concerns.
Second, we show that the presence of career eﬀects produce incentives that can be
highly non-monotone in observable measures of uncertainty. Consequently, we oﬀer a
possible explanation for the fact that empirical studies observe both a positive and neg-
ative correlation between risk and incentives.7 Specifically, and in contrast with the
theoretical prediction of the traditional principal-agent model, we show that optimal
monetary incentives are increasing in the noise of the verifiable signal. The reason is
simple; more noise on this signal shifts the attention the market gives to performance
from this signal to other signals when calculating the agent’s talent. This shift in atten-
tion reduces the agent’s career incentives on the verifiable task, making it necessary for
the principal to oﬀer stronger monetary incentives to restore the balance between total
incentives on the two tasks.
Third, we find that career concern incentives might be harmful for welfare. The
intuition behind this result is that career eﬀects may be so strong that the agent’s cost
of providing more eﬀort outweighs the associated increase in production value.8
Fourth, we provide new insight into the question of whether implicit incentives take
6See also Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a).
7Prendergast (2000) gives an overview of the empirical literature on the tradeoﬀ of risk and incentives.
See also Prendergast (1999, 2002).
8Holmstrom (1982) contains a similar result.
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the form of career incentives or ratchet eﬀects.9 Prendergast (1999) considers this issue.
He considers a model where monetary contracts are based on a (single) subjective assess-
ment of performance, and the agent can exert productive eﬀort as well as unproductive
’bias activity’ to influence the assessment. There are then career incentives when the
agent is equally productive in all firms and they compete for his services. Monetary and
implicit incentives are substitutes, and it is pointed out that monetary incentives are
increasing in the noisiness of the subjective performance measure. It is also pointed out
that the implicit incentives take the form of ratchet eﬀects when the agent’s talent has
productive value only for the inside firm.
Contrary to Prendergast’s focus on subjective performance assessments and unpro-
ductive influence activity, ours is on ’productive multitasking’ with verifiable performance
measures being available for some, but not all tasks. In this setting implicit incentives
take the form of either career concerns or ratchet eﬀects depending on whether the
market values the agent’s talent more than the inside firm values the agent’s eﬀort-
productivity. That is, in our model ratchet eﬀects come into being when one unit talent
is less productive in the market than one unit eﬀort for the inside firm.
Finally we consider the case where the principal hires several agents. The main
issue under consideration is how the principal should organize tasks among agents in
cases where it is possible to separate tasks (e.g., medical research and treatment of
patients). That is, should each agent have sole responsibility for one task, or should the
principal oﬀer the agents jobs in which they both bear joint responsibility for both tasks?
We find that joint responsibility leads to weaker individual career incentives compared
to sole responsibility. In some situations such weak career incentives are detrimental,
and to such an extent that sole responsibility is the better organizational design. In
other situations career incentives are too strong when jobs are separated, and then joint
responsibility is the better design. These results indicate that career concerns have strong
implications for optimal job design.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the model and the first-
best solution. Section 3 characterizes optimal contracts when the principal is hiring one
agent, and the multi-agent problem is analyzed in section 4. Finally, section 5 presents
some concluding remarks.
9Building on the work by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)–see also Itoh (1991, 1992, 1993)– Meyer,
Olsen, and Torsvik (1996) and Olsen and Torsvik (2000) analyze how ratchet eﬀects aﬀect optimal
monetary incentives and welfare in a multitask agency model. These models do however suppress career
concerns and focus exclusively on ratchet eﬀects.
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2. The model
There is one agent, two tasks (with associated signals z and q), and two periods. For
concreteness we can think of the tasks as provision of quantity and quality, respectively,
for some product. The tasks compete for the agent’s attention, and eﬀorts are thus
substitutes in the agent’s cost function. The agent’s choice of eﬀorts determines the
agent’s total contribution to the principal, denoted by yt. That is, yt reflects everything
the principal cares about, except for wages, in period t. We assume that no contract
on y can be enforced in court because it is prohibitively costly to specify this outcome
ex ante in such a way that it can be verified by a third party ex post. We do however
assume that all parties—insiders as well as outsiders—observe the y−signal ex post.10
Contrary to the signal on the agent’s total contribution, the performance signal asso-
ciated with one task (z) is verifiable, so monetary incentives for that task can be provided
through this (production) signal. Hence incentives on the production signal serves as a
means to increase the agent’s total contribution for the principal. Since this signal is
verifiable, all parties observe it.
The performance signal associated with the other task (the quality signal, q) is non-
verifiable. Yet some incentives are provided for this task through career concerns. We
consider the case where these career concerns are determined by the outside market
(or outside principals or the professional environment). All parties—insiders as well as
outsiders—observe the q−signal, and favorable realizations of this signal improve the
agent’s standing on the job market. To sum up, the principals oﬀer the agent (linear)
payments wit = A
i
t + α
i
tz
i
t, where i = I,O denotes the inside and outside principals,
respectively.11
The agent which is risk-neutral privately chooses (at, bt) , where at (bt) is eﬀort sup-
plied into the production of zt (qt) . The private cost (in monetary units) is C (at, bt) ,
where C (., .) is strictly convex, and eﬀorts are substitutes for the agent: Cab := ∂
2C
∂a∂b > 0.
To simplify the algebra we assume a quadratic cost function
C(a, b) =
1
2
a2 +
1
2
b2 + γab, 0 ≤ γ < 1
When the agent works for principal i (i = I,O) the relevant signals are
yit = h
iη + f iat + gibt + εit, i = I,O
zit = η + at + ν
i
t,
qit = η + bt + τ
i
t,
where η is the agent’s unknown ability. The ability η is drawn at the beginning of the
first period from a normal distribution with meanm0 and variance σ2η, i.e.η ∼ N(m0, σ2η).
We also assume that εit ∼ N(0, σ2y), νit ∼ N(0, σ2z), τ it ∼ N(0, σ2q), and the productivity
10Kaarbøe and Olsen (2001) study a similar model where insiders have more information than out-
siders.
11The focus on linear contracts can be justified by appeal to a richer dynamic model in which linear
payments are optimal (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987).
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parameters (hi, f i, and gi) are positive. All noise terms are independent of each other
and of ability η. All parties observe xit = (y
i
t, z
i
t, q
i
t). The principals competing in every
period for the agent’s services can observe neither the actions taken by the agent nor
his ability. They only observe the output xit, and use it in every period to update their
beliefs about his ability. The net benefit for the (risk-neutral) principal who employs
the agent is given by yit − wit, and total surplus for the principal and the agent is given
by Sit (at, bt) := y
i
t − C(at, bt), i = I,O.
We further assume that, after an agent has worked for a principal, a special relation-
ship is formed between the two, e.g. due to the agent learning specific ways to perform
the tasks, resulting in an increased fixed benefit for this principal from keeping the agent
in his service. The additional benefit is suﬃciently large that the inside principal will
always want to retain the agent, even if unfavorable signals are observed in the first pe-
riod. This kind of assumption is in line with assumptions made in the existing literature
(e.g. Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Meyer and Vickers 1997). To simplify notation we will
drop superscript I when referring to variables generated inside this relationship. Thus
xt = (yt, zt, qt) and (h, f, g) refer to information signals and productivity parameters,
respectively, when the agent works for the inside principal. Finally let only one-period
contracts be feasible.
2.1. First-best eﬀorts
As a reference case consider the first-best solution (when eﬀorts are contractible). Prin-
cipal i will then choose eﬀorts each period to maximize f iat + gibt −C(at, bt). Focusing
on the ’inside’ principal, we find that the optimum is as follows.
I. When marginal productivities on the two tasks are suﬃciently close, f−γg > 0 and
g−γf > 0, it is optimal to induce eﬀorts on both tasks. First-best eﬀorts and value
(each period) are then aFB = f−γg
1−γ2 , b
FB = g−γf
1−γ2 and S
FB = hm0 + 12
f2+g2−2γfg
1−γ2 ,
respectively, where m0 is expected ability.
II. Otherwise, when marginal productivities are not close, it is optimal to concentrate
eﬀort only on the most productive task. For g − γf < 0 we have bFB = 0,
aFB = f and SFB = hm0 + 12f
2. For f − γg < 0 we have aFB = 0, bFB = g and
SFB = hm0 + 12g
2.
To see the intuition for case II note that, starting from a = f, b = 0 the marginal
cost of exerting eﬀort on b is Cb(a, 0) = γa = γf . If this cost exceeds the marginal value
g, it is not worthwhile to exert eﬀort on the b−task.
We are here primarily interested in the case where it is first-best eﬃcient to have
the agent working on both tasks, so we will in the following assume that marginal
productivities are close, so that case I applies. Note that for equal productivities (g = f),
the first-best value is SFB = hm0 +
f2
1+γ . This value is clearly higher than what can be
obtained by concentrating eﬀort on only one task.
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3. Optimal contracts for one agent
Consider now the case where contracts can only be written on signal zt. Assume further
that only short-term contracts can be written. The agent starts working for the inside
principal in period 1. In the second period the agent may leave and seek outside employ-
ment. We assume that there is a (small) positive probability p > 0 that the agent must
leave for exogenous reasons, such as a move triggered by a job change for the agent’s
spouse etc., and that an outside principal cannot observe whether the agent leaves vol-
untarily or due to such exogenous events. Competition among the outside principals will
then ensure that the agent is oﬀered a contract, wO2 (x1), that earns zero expected profits
for such a principal.12 This will be an equilibrium because (a) the inside principal will in
any case match this oﬀer, hence (b) there is no reason for the agent to leave voluntarily
(no self-selection), and (c) an outside principal cannot therefore deduce anything helpful
about the agent’s type from her behavior on the job market.
To characterize the optimal contract note that the agent’s problem in an arbitrary
period is given by
max
a,b
{A+ αa+ βb− C (a, b)} ,
where β is the career incentive on the q−task and α is the eﬀective incentive on the
z−task.13 The first-order conditions (for an interior solution) are Ca − α = 0, and
Cb − β = 0, where Ci := ∂C∂i , i = a, b. These conditions define eﬀorts as functions of
eﬀective incentives; a = a (α, β) and b = b (α, β) . For later reference we diﬀerentiate the
first-order conditions w.r.t α and obtain bα := dbdα = −γaα, and aα :=
da
dα =
1
1−γ2 , where
γ := Cab.
We now characterize the optimal contract in the second, and last, period. In this
period there is no career incentives. Hence b2 = 0 and total expected surplus when the
agent is working for principal i is given by
ESi2 = h
iE (η | x1) + f ia (α2)− C(a (α2) , 0),
where E is the expectation operator. By diﬀerentiating this expression we obtain
∂
∂α2
ESi2 = (f
i − Ca) aα2 . It is obviously optimal to set α∗i2 = f i. Hence, the agent is
oﬀered incentives that are eﬃcient for the z−task in isolation in the second period.
Competition among outside principals will ensure that the agent is oﬀered a contract
that earns zero expected profits for such a principal, i.e.: E
¡
yO2 | x1
¢
= E
¡
wO2 | x1
¢
.
In order to retain the agent the inside principal must match this oﬀer, hence the wage
contract (w2 = A2 + α∗2z2) must satisfy
A2 + α∗2E (z2 | x1)− C∗ ≥ E
¡
yO2 | x1
¢
− C∗O
where C∗ and C∗O are the eﬀort costs if the agent works for the inside or the out-
side principal, respectively. It follows that the salary component A2 satisfies A2 =
12We assume that outside principals oﬀer relatively simple contracts and hence do not oﬀer screening
contracts.
13There may be career incentives, say βa, also on the latter task, and then α = α
x + βa, where α
x is
the explicit incentive on that task.
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¡
hO − α∗2
¢
E (η | x1) + const, where the constant is independent of x1. The optimal
second-period wage contract thus takes the form:
w2 (x1) =
¡
hO − α∗2
¢
E (η | x1) + α∗2z2 + const, where
E (η | x1) = Eη +Rz (z1 −Ez1) +Rq (q1 −Eq1) +Ry (y1 −Ey1) .
The exact expressions for the regression coeﬃcients Ri = ∂∂iE (η | x1) , i = y, q, z are
contained in Appendix A.2. Here we simply note thatRi ∈ [0, 1] and depends on the noise
terms σ2i , i = η, y, z, q, as well as the productivity parameter of ability h. Furthermore
we note that the if the z−signal is more noisy than the q−signal (i.e. σ2z > σ2q), more
weight is put on q relative to z in estimating the agent’s ability.
After characterizing the second-period wage contract we turn to period one. First
of all we notice that since the second period compensation depends on the first period
signals, x1 = (y1, z1, q1) , the agent has incentives to exert eﬀort in the first period to
aﬀect his market value. Working for the inside principal the agent thus chooses eﬀort
according to
max
a1,b1
©
α1a1 − C (a1, b1) +
¡
hO − α∗2
¢
E (η | x1) + const
ª
.
where E (η | x1) is calculated on the basis of expected (equilibrium) eﬀorts, so that
the marginal eﬀect of an eﬀort deviation on this expectation is given by the relevant
regression coeﬃcients Ri The first-order conditions for the agent are then:
a1 ≥ 0, Ca ≥ α1 + (Rz + fRy)
¡
hO − α∗2
¢
:= α1 + βa, (3.1a)
b1 ≥ 0, Cb ≥ (Rq + gRy)
¡
hO − α∗2
¢
:= βb. (3.1b)
where βi is the implicit (career incentive) on task i = a, b, and the inequalities hold with
complementary slackness.
To characterize optimal first-period incentives we diﬀerentiate the expression for total
expected surplus in period one, Ey1 − C (a1, b1) , and obtain ∂∂α1ES = (f − Ca) aα +
(g − Cb) bα, where bα = −γaα and aα = 11−γ2 for interior solutions (as before). Interior
solutions (eﬀorts on both tasks) are optimal for the principal when the implicit incentive
on the b−task exceeds some critical value (βb > βcrit), see below. In that case we can
substitute from the agent’s first-order conditions into the expression for ∂∂α1ES to see
that the optimal first-period monetary incentive is given by
α∗1 = α
∗
2 − βa + γ (βb − g) , (α∗2 = f). (3.2)
We can now analyze how optimal monetary incentives vary over time.
First we consider the case where one unit talent is less productive than one unit eﬀort
on the z−task, i.e. the case where hO ≤ f. In this case both βa and βb are non-positive.
Hence, the agent will choose zero eﬀort on the q−task (b1 = 0), and the principal will
consequently ensure that total incentives on the z−task equal the productivity parameter
on that task, i.e. α∗1 + βa = f. When βa < 0 there is a ratchet eﬀect associated with
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the z−task, and optimal monetary incentives in period one have to be larger than the
optimal incentives in the second period, thus α∗1 > f = α
∗
2.
If hO > f, things are diﬀerent. In this case there are career incentives on both tasks,
and the agent will optimally choose to provide eﬀort on both tasks if incentives on the
two tasks do not deviate too much. Now optimal monetary incentives must balance not
only the career incentives on the z−task but also how the agent should divide his eﬀort
between the two tasks. Note that this latter eﬀect depends on how close the career
incentives on the q−task are to the first-best eﬀort on this task, i.e., on βb − g, and on
how close substitutes the tasks are in the agent’s cost function, i.e. on γ. When the size
of these two eﬀects are small, that is when either βb − g or γ are close to zero, optimal
first-period monetary incentives are set mainly in response to the career incentives on
the z−task. Since career incentives are positive, first-period monetary incentives will be
lower than second-period incentives.
On the other hand, when either βb−g or γ are large, the principal puts less emphasis
on the q−signal and thus raises first-period monetary incentives to induce more eﬀort
on the z−task. If in addition the career incentives on the z−task are low, e.g. because
principals put a relatively small weight on this signal in estimating the agent’s ability
(σ2z large), first period monetary incentives will typically be larger than second-period
incentives.
The following proposition sums up this discussion and provides a formal characteri-
zation of optimal incentives. See Appendix A.1 for a proof.
Proposition 1. i) Suppose hO ≤ f , i.e. that talent is less productive on the outside
than ’quantity eﬀort’ is on the inside. Then the agent will not to provide any eﬀort on
the q−task, and there is a ratchet eﬀect associated with the z−signal. Furthermore,
optimal monetary incentives are strongest early in the agent’s career.
ii) Suppose hO > f. Then there are career eﬀects on both tasks. There is a critical value
βcrit ∈ (0, g) for the implicit incentive on the q−task such that the following holds:
(a) For βb ≤ βcrit it is optimal to induce eﬀort only on the z−task, and the optimal
monetary incentive on that task satisfies α∗1 + βa = f . Monetary incentives are then
lowest early in the agent’s career.
(b) For βb > β
crit it is optimal to induce eﬀorts on both tasks, and the optimal monetary
incentive (on the z−task) is given by (3.2). Monetary incentives are then strongest
(weakest) early in the agent’s career if and only if γ (βb − g)− βa > (<) 0. The optimal
first-period value is in this case
S∗ = hm0 + (gβb −
β2b
2
) +
1
2
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 (3.3)
We now relate Proposition 1 to the existing literature of monetary incentives and
career concerns.
The fact that optimal monetary incentives can be strongest early in the agent’s career
in the presence of career eﬀects is at variance with the predictions from the theoretical
model in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and is due to the fact that monetary incentives
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here also serve the task of allocating the agent’s eﬀort between the two tasks. In this
sense monetary and implicit incentives eﬀectively become complementary if there is
strong substitutability between the tasks in the agent’s cost function (large γ), or if
career incentives are too high on the q−task, βb > g such that higher career incentives
on that task imply a shift in focus implying higher monetary incentives on the other
task.14
Secondly, we comment on the budget-run agencies-result from Dewatripont, Jewitt,
and Tirole (1999b). This result is stated in their Proposition 3.3, and says that if i) the
principal only cares about the sum of the agent’s eﬀort (and not its distribution among
tasks), ii) that only one task is contractible, iii) that eﬀorts are perfect substitutes in the
agent’s cost function, and iv) that there are equal and positive career incentives on all
non-verifiable tasks, then in the additive case, the agency is run as a fixed-budget agency.
In our framework this situation is captured in equation 3.2 when both tasks are equally
productive for the inside principal, i.e. f = g, the noisiness of the q− and z−signals
are the same so that βa = βb, and when γ / 1, so that eﬀorts are almost perfect
substitutes in the agent’s cost function. With these restrictions, the principal cannot
give the agent monetary incentives, and the equilibrium eﬀort levels are implemented by
giving the agent a fixed budget. In out view, this shows that the budget-run agencies-
result from Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b) builds on strong assumptions, and
that monetary incentives typically can be provided without abandoning the other tasks.
Thirdly, we note that implicit incentives take the form of either career concerns or
ratchet eﬀects depending on whether the market values the agent’s talent more than
the inside firm values the agent’s eﬀort-productivity. Specifically ratchet eﬀects come
into being when one unit talent is less productive in the market than one unit eﬀort for
the inside firm. This result is to be contrasted to the result in Prendergast (1999) who
shows that implicit incentives take the form of ratchet eﬀects when the agent’s talent
has productive value only for the inside firm.
Finally, we note that this model produces comparative statics results in line with those
of Holmstrom (1982) regarding uncertainty about the agent’s ability: career incentives
are monotonically increasing in the ability variance, σ2η. Note however that optimal
first-period monetary incentives are increasing (decreasing) in the ability variance only
when γ is high (low). This result follows from the fact that optimal monetary incentives
are increasing in career concerns associated with the q−task and decreasing in career
incentives associated with the z−task. Hence the relative magnitude of these two career
eﬀects will determine if first-period monetary incentives increase or decrease with the
ability variance. This magnitude again depends on the degree of substitutability between
the two tasks in the agent’s cost function. In the same vein, optimal incentives are
decreasing in the market noise σ2q.
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14Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b) show that a similar result may arise in the case where the
eﬀort structure is multiplicative. Note, however, that this result does not hold when they consider an
additive eﬀort structure (as in the model presented here). Kaarbøe and Olsen (2001) show a similar
result in the case where the tasks are perfect substitutes for the agent. Then explicit incentives on one
of the tasks must equal the career incentives on the other task if the principal prefers eﬀort on both
tasks.
15This conclusion is however not so straight forward as it may seem, since the career incentives
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More interestingly, optimal monetary incentives are here increasing in the noise of
the verifiable signal, σ2z. The reason is simple; more noise in this signal reduces the
implicit career incentive on this task and increases the career incentive on the other
task. This shift in career incentives is induced by the market now putting relatively less
weight on the more noisy signal when updating its beliefs regarding the agent’s ability.
Since implicit incentives as a result shift towards the non-verifiable task, the principal
must oﬀer more monetary incentives to restore the balance between total incentives on
the two tasks. The following proposition sums up the discussion. See Appendix A.4 for
a proof.
Proposition 2. Suppose hO > f , and define γ :=
σ2q(σ2y+hσ2zf)
σ2z(σ2y+hσ2qg)
. Then optimal monetary
incentives are
i) increasing in the ability noise if γ > γ, and decreasing for γ < γ.
ii) decreasing in the market noise (σ2q), and
iii) increasing in the noise of the verifiable signal.
We now turn to welfare analysis. More specifically we want to analyze how implicit
incentives on the two tasks aﬀect the total expected surplus for the principal and the
agent. A generalization of Proposition 1 (from period one to any period t) shows that the
optimal value for the principal and the agent is given by16 S∗ = hm0+(gβb−
β2b
2
)+1
2
(f−γg)2
1−γ2 ,
for βbt > β
crit. From this expression we immediately have the following proposition, which
is parallel to one of the results obtained in Meyer and Vickers (1997) and Holmstrom
(1982), (part i) and part ii) respectively.)
Proposition 3. Suppose it is optimal to induce eﬀort on both tasks. Then
i) Welfare is independent of implicit incentives on the verifiable task (can be neutralized
by monetary incentives).
ii) First-period welfare varies non-monotonously with the implicit career incentives on
the non-verifiable task.
4. Joint vs. sole responsibility
We now consider the case where the principal wants to hire two agents. The main issue
under consideration is how the principal should organize the tasks among the agents.
That is, in situations where it is possible to split the tasks, should each agent have sole
responsibility for one task, or should the principal oﬀer the agents jobs in which they
both bear joint responsibility for both tasks? One such situation arises e.g. if the tasks
are treatment of patients and medical research or teaching.17
associated with the q−task may in fact increase with the market noise if the principal values the q−task
so highly that she chooses to implement no eﬀort on the z−task. Since our focus is on multitasking we
abstract from this situation.
16See also Appendix A.5.
17See also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Meyer, Olsen, and Torsvik (1996) for analyses of
optimal job-design.
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We assume that the agents are identical and that agents’ abilities are uncorrelated.
Hence, the signals generated by one of the agents are uninformative about the other
agent’s ability (and eﬀorts). Finally, let Sit i = S, J denote total expected surplus for
the principal and the agents in period t = 1, 2 for the case of sole respectively joint
responsibility.
As in the case of one agent, we first characterize the first-best solution.
4.1. First-best
Again we assume an interior solution, i.e.: f −γg > 0 and g−γf > 0, or γ < min{ gf , fg}.
From section 2.1 we know that eﬀort on both tasks is optimal, and that the optimal
value is18
SFB =
g2
2
+
1
2
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 =
1
2
f2 + g2 − 2γfg
1− γ2 =
f2
2
+
1
2
(g − γf)2
1− γ2
This value is higher than concentration on any single task (SFB > max{1
2
f2, 1
2
g2}) since
SFB − g
2
2
=
1
2
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 > 0, S
FB − f
2
2
=
1
2
(g − γf)2
1− γ2 > 0
The last term is the contribution from eﬀort being ’spread’ to the second task.19
If two agents are working for the principal and have sole responsibility for one task
it follows that total surplus is SS = 1
2
f2 + 1
2
g2. On the other hand, if both have joint
responsibility we get
SJ = 2SFB =
1
2
f2 +
1
2
g2 +
1
2
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 +
1
2
(g − γf)2
1− γ2 .
From this it follows that SJ > SS, and thus the first-best optimal job design is one where
the agents have joint responsibility.
4.2. Job Design and Agency
Sole responsibility. In this case one agent is working on task a, and one on task b.
Four information signals are generated in each period, y1t , y
2
t , zt and qt, where y
i
t denotes
the total contribution of agent i = 1, 2. We first consider agent one who is working
on task a. His choice problem in period t is maxat
©
At + αSt a
1
t − C (at, 0)
ª
,where αSt is
the total incentive on task a, i.e. the sum of explicit (αxSt ) and implicit (β
S
t )incentives:
αSt = α
xS
t + β
S
at. Note that the implicit incentives are determined by the information
signals generated by agent one, that is by y1t−1, zt−1. Solving the agent’s maximization
problem gives us the first-order condition: αSt = Cat = at. Since total expected surplus
18To simplify notation we drop the the term hm0 in this section.
19The intuition for this is that, starting from a = f, b = 0 the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort on b is
Cb(a, 0) = γa = γf . When this cost is less than the marginal value g, it is advantageous to exert some
eﬀort on the b−task.
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in period t is given by y1t − C(at), optimal monetary incentives are adjusted such that
f −Cat = 0. Hence, optimal monetary incentives will adjust the implicit incentives such
that the agent’s eﬀort is eﬃcient for the z−task in isolation, i.e., at = f.
Similar considerations for agent two gives us Cbt = bt = β
S
bt, where β
S
bt is the implicit
(career) incentive on the b−task in this setting. Total maximal expected welfare for both
agents and the principal (seen from period one) is thus S∗S = 3
2
f2+
¡
g − 1
2
βSb1
¢
βSb1 . Note
that βb2 = 0, and that the principal realizes this such that both agents are working on
task a in the second period.
Joint responsibility. Suppose now we assign jobs such that both agents are working
on both tasks. Hence six information signals are generated in each period (yit, z
i
t, q
i
t,
i = 1, 2). We know that this job design is optimal in a first-best world where monetary
incentives can be provided on both tasks. The question is here whether the agency
problems associated with this design may be worse than those associated with the design
where agents have sole responsibility. We see that the information structures (e.g. the
number of signals) are diﬀerent for the two designs, and we will show that this may in
fact make sole responsibility the better alternative.
By solving the agents’ maximization problem for the current case (joint responsibil-
ity), and by assuming an interior solution, we know from Proposition 1 that maximal
welfare in period t is given by S∗Jt = (g − 12β
J
bt)β
J
bt +
1
2
(f−γg)2
1−γ2 , where β
J
bt is the implicit
(career) incentive on the b−task in this case. Note that βJb2 = 0, such that equilibrium
eﬀorts in period 2 are b2 = 0, a2 = f, and hence SJ2 = S
S
2 = 2
¡
1
2
f2
¢
. From this it follows
that the principal’s decision about job design is determined by comparing total expected
welfare for sole, respectively joint, responsibility in period one. The principal’s decision
on job design is thus determined by
S∗J1 − S∗S1 = 2(g −
1
2
βJb1)β
J
b1 −
µ
g − 1
2
βSb1
¶
βSb1 +
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 −
1
2
f2 T 0. (4.1)
The first two parts in this expression reflect the contribution from the b−task; the two
latter parts thus reflect the contribution to total welfare from the a−task. We first
consider the b−task.
From the agent’s first order condition (equation (3.1b)) it follows that
βib1 =
¡
Riq + gR
i
y
¢ ¡
hO − α∗2
¢
, i = S, J, where RSj =
∂
∂jE (η | y21, q1) , and
RJj =
∂
∂jE (η | yi1, zi1, qi1) , i = 1, 2 and j = q, y. The exact expressions for these regression
coeﬃcients are contained in Appendix A.6. Here we simply note that RSj = limσ2z→∞R
J
j ,
and that
∂RJj
∂σ2z
> 0, j = y, q. Note that these facts imply that βJb1 < β
S
b1 . That is, joint
responsibility leads to weaker individual career incentives on the non-verifiable task com-
pared to sole responsibility. When each agent works on both tasks (joint responsibility)
the market can base its assessment of each agent’s ability on three agent-specific signals
(yit, z
i
t, q
i
t). The weight put on the non-verifiable q−signal is then smaller than if the
market can base its assessment only on two agent-specific signals (yit, q
i
t), and this leads
weaker incentives on the non-verifiable task under joint compared to sole responsibil-
ity. Such weak career incentives may be detrimental, and to such an extent that sole
responsibility becomes a better organizational design.
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Suppose for instance that parameters are such that we have βSb1 close to the marginal
productivity g, while βJb1 is small and close to the critical value β
crit. By definition of
βcrit we see that for βJb1 = β
crit we have S∗J − S∗S = 1
2
f2 − (g − 1
2
βSb1)β
S
b1. When f < g
we further see that there is a range of values for βSb1 (including β
S
b1 = g) where this
diﬀerence is negative, and hence where sole responsibility will be the optimal design.
Further considerations of this diﬀerence show the following (see the appendix):
Proposition 4. Sole responsibility leads to stronger career incentives than joint re-
sponsibility, and may for this reason be a better way to assign jobs. In particular, sole
responsibility is better than joint responsibility when βSb1 is ’large’ and β
J
b1 and β
S
b1 are
’close’ (βJb1 ≤ β
S
b1 < βˆ
S
1 for some critical βˆ
S
1 ). For f < g sole responsibility is better than
joint responsibility also when βSb1is close to g while β
S
b1 is close to β
crit.
5. Conclusion
Incentives contracts in govermental agencies must typically be based on performance
measures that do not exactly match the principal’s gross benefits. In addition, agents
working in these organizations often perform multiple tasks and have career concerns.
The main focus is this paper has been to analyze how these facts aﬀect the optimal
incentive schemes between principals and agents when only one-period contracts are
feasible. To do so we have put forward a simple dynamic multitask career concern model
with monetary incentives where the principal’s gross benefit cannot be rewarded directly,
and where the agent’s career concern are determined by the professional environment.
The general conclusion we have obtained is that the optimal incentives scheme must
balance the professional career concerns in two ways. Firstly, monetary incentives must
balance the career incentives on the task which can be economically rewarded. Secondly,
monetary incentives must balance how the agent should divide his/her eﬀort among the
tasks. Even though this general conclusion is quite in line with simple intuition, we will
stress that the optimal incentive schemes we derive overturn some of the guidelines that
emerge from a single task analysis. For example we have shown that optimal monetary
incentives can be non-monotone or strongest earliest in agents’ careers, and that career
concerns have strong implications for optimal job design.
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Appendices
A. Technicalities
In this appendix we provide more details regarding some of the calculations in this paper.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
It remains to prove part (ii) of the proposition. Recall the maintained assumptions
f − γg > 0, g − γf > 0. For the purpose of this proof we let α denote the eﬀective
incentive on the a-task, while β denotes the implicit incentive on the b-task. We have
β > 0. The principal chooses α to solve
max
α
S = fa+ gb− (1
2
a2 +
1
2
b2 + γab) s.t.
α− (a+ γb) ≤ 0, a ≥ 0
β − (b+ γa) ≤ 0, b ≥ 0
where the inequalities in the IC constraints (for the agent’s choice of eﬀorts) hold with
complementary slackness. For given α, β there are three subcases:
(i) α ≤ γβ: Then a = 0, b = β and S = gβ − 1
2
β2.
(ii) γβ < α < βγ : Interior solution with
a =
α− γβ
1− γ2 , b =
β − γα
1− γ2
S =
1
2
2αγβ + 2fα+ 2gβ − 2fγβ − 2gγα− β2 − α2
1− γ2
(iii) α ≥ βγ : Then b = 0, a = α and S = fα−
1
2
α2.
Note that S as a function of α (S(α)) is non-concave and has kinks at α = γβ and at
α = βγ . The right-hand derivative at the former point is seen to be
∂S
∂α(γβ
+) = f−gγ
1−γ2 > 0,
hence α ≤ γβ (and thus no eﬀort on the a-task) is never optimal. We further find
∂S
∂α
(
β
γ
−
) =
1
1− γ2 (f − gγ − (
1
γ
− γ)β)
∂S
∂α
(
β
γ
+
) = f − β
γ
Consider now various cases for β.
(A) β ≥ γf .
Note that the assumption g > γf implies f−gγ
1−γ2 < f , and hence that β ≥ γf implies
∂S
∂α(
β
γ
−
) < 0 and ∂S∂α(
β
γ
+
) ≤ 0. This means that optimal α satisfies γβ < α < βγ (case ii
above). Straightforward calculations show that the optimum is
α∗ = f − gγ + γβ
S∗ = (gβ − β
2
2
) +
1
2
(f − γg)2
1− γ2
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(B) γ f−gγ
1−γ2 < β < γf .
Now we have ∂S∂α(
β
γ
−
) < 0 and ∂S∂α(
β
γ
+
) > 0. Hence there are two local optima:
(α∗, S∗) given above and the local optimum where only the a-task is pursued, i.e α = f
and S = Sa = 1
2
f2. Comparing the local maxima we find S∗ > Sa iﬀ β > βcrit given by
βcrit = g − (g − γf)(1− γ2)−1/2
Note that 0 < γ f−gγ
1−γ2 < β
crit < γf < g when g > γf and f > γg.
(C) β ≤ γ f−gγ
1−γ2 . In this case we have
∂S
∂α(
β
γ
−
) ≥ 0 and ∂S∂α(
β
γ
+
) > 0, hence it is optimal
to choose α > βγ ; i.e. α = f is optimal.
Overall we can conclude that
Smax =
1
2
f2 (with a = f, b = 0) for β < βcrit
Smax = S∗ (with a > 0, b > 0) for β > βcrit
¥
A.2. Regression coeﬃcients
We consider the case of one agent and two periods (t = 1, 2). The information signals
are
yt = hη + fat + gbt + ε
y
t
zt = η + at + εzt
qt = η + bt + ε
q
t .
We seek E(η | y1, z1, q1). The covariance matrix is
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
σ2η hσ
2
η σ
2
η σ
2
η
hσ2η h
2σ2η + σ
2
y hσ
2
η hσ
2
η
σ2η hσ
2
η σ
2
η + σ
2
z σ
2
η
σ2η hσ
2
η σ
2
η σ
2
η + σ
2
q
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
where
σ2η = var(η)
σ2y = var(ε
y
t )
σ2z = var(ε
z
t )
σ2q = var(ε
z
t )
.
By inverting and applying well-known formulas (e.g., DeGroot (1970)) we get
Ry =
∂
∂y
E (η | x1) =
hσ2ησ
2
zσ
2
q
h2σ2ησ2zσ2q + σ2yσ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2zσ2η + σ2yσ2zσ2q
Rz =
∂
∂z
E (η | x1) =
σ2ησ
2
yσ
2
q
h2σ2ησ2zσ2q + σ2yσ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2zσ2η + σ2yσ2zσ2q
Rq =
∂
∂q
E (η | x1) =
σ2ησ
2
yσ
2
z
h2σ2ησ2zσ2q + σ2yσ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2zσ2η + σ2yσ2zσ2q
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where h = hI .
A.3. The derivatives
Simple calculations give the following derivatives
∂Rz
∂σ2z
= −σ2ησ2y
σ2q
D2
¡
h2σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¢
< 0,
∂Ry
∂σ2z
= h(σ2η)
2
¡
σ2q
¢2 σ2y
D2
> 0,
∂Rq
∂σ2z
= (σ2η)
2(σ2y)
2
σ2q
D2
> 0,
∂Ry
∂σ2η
= hσ2zσ
2
q
σ2y
D2
> 0
∂Rz
∂σ2η
= σ2yσ
2
q
σ2z
D2
> 0
∂Rq
∂σ2η
= σ2yσ
2
z
σ2q
D2
> 0
∂Ry
∂σ2q
= hσ2η
¡
σ2z
¢2 σ2y
D2
> 0
∂Rz
∂σ2q
=
¡
σ2y
¢2 ¡
σ2η
¢2 σ2z
D2
> 0
∂Rq
∂σ2q
= −σ2ησ2y
σ2z
D2
¡
h2σ2ησ
2
z + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
z
¢
< 0,
where D :=
¡
h2σ2ησ
2
zσ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
zσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
zσ
2
q
¢
.
A.4. Proof of Proposition
Proposition 2 claims that
i)
∂α∗1
∂σ2η
= −∂βa
∂σ2η
+ γ
∂βb
∂σ2η
> 0 iff γ >
σ2q
¡
σ2y + hσ
2
zf
¢
σ2z
¡
σ2y + hσ2qg
¢
ii)
∂α∗1
∂σ2q
= −∂βa
∂σ2q
+ γ
∂βb
∂σ2q
< 0
iii)
∂α∗1
∂σ2z
= −∂βa
∂σ2z
+ γ
∂βb
∂σ2z
> 0.
AD i) In Appendix A.3 we show that ∂Ri∂σ2η > 0 for i = y, z, q. Hence an increase in
the ability noise increases the career incentives on both tasks, i.e. ∂βi∂σ2η > 0, i = a, b.
Since, certeris paribus, increased career incentives on the z−task and on the q−task
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have opposite eﬀect on the monetary incentives will the total eﬀect be determined by
their relative strength. This latter eﬀect depends on γ. More specifically, the career
eﬀects from the q−signal dominates when γ > bq by+hbzfbz(by+hbqg) . This follows since
∂α∗1
∂σ2η
=
µ
−∂Rz
∂σ2η
+ γ
∂Rq
∂σ2η
− (f − γg) ∂Ry
∂σ2η
¶
(h− f)
=
¡
σ2yσ
2
zσ
2
q
¡
−σ2yσ2q + γσ2yσ2z − hσ2zσ2qf + hσ2zσ2qγg
¢¢ h− f
D2
> 0 iﬀ
¡
−σ2yσ2q + γσ2yσ2z − hσ2zσ2qf + hσ2zσ2qγg
¢
> 0
Hence ∂α
∗
1
∂σ2η
> 0 iﬀ γ > σ2q
σ2y+hσ
2
zf
σ2z(σ2y+hσ2qg)
AD ii) We have
∂α∗1
∂σ2q
= −∂βa
∂σ2q
+ γ
∂βb
∂σ2q
=
µ
γ
∂Rq
∂σ2q
− ∂Rz
∂σ2q
− (f − γg) ∂Ry
∂σ2q
¶¡
hO − f
¢
In Appendix A.3 we show that ∂Rz∂σ2q > 0,
∂Ry
∂σ2q
> 0, and ∂Rq∂σ2q < 0. Hence
∂βa
∂σ2q
> 0.
Furthermore ∂βb∂σ2q > 0 only for ‘large’ values of g. This follows since
∂Rq
∂σ2q
− g∂Ry
∂σ2q
= −σ2yσ2zσ2η
h2σ2ησ
2
z + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
z + ghσ
2
ησ
2
z
D2
Hence,
∂βb
∂σ2q
1
γ (hO − f) =
∂Rq
∂σ2q
+ g
∂Ry
∂σ2q
= −σ2yσ2zσ2η
h2σ2ησ
2
z + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
z − ghσ2ησ2z
D2
.
To ensure an interior solution we also need the restriction f − γg > 0. Hence the
∂βb
∂σ2q
> 0−eﬀect will never dominate, and the conclusion follows.
AD iii) We have
∂α∗1
∂σ2z
=
∂βa
∂σ2z
+ γ
∂βb
∂σ2z
=
µ
−∂Rz
∂σ2z
+ γ
∂Rq
∂σ2z
− (f − γg) ∂Ry
∂σ2z
¶
(h− f)
= −σ2yσ2ησ2q
h(f − h)σ2ησ2q − σ2yσ2η − σ2yσ2q − γσ2yσ2η − hσ2ησ2qγg
D2
> 0
since h− f > 0. Hence ∂α
∗
1
∂σ2z
> 0 for γ > 0. ¥
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A.5. The Welfare analysis
By solving the opimization problem,
S∗t = maxαt
St(at, bt)
s.t. at = at(αt, βa, βb, γ), bt = bt(αt, βa, βb, γ)
we obtain α∗t = α
∗
t (βa, βb, γ, f, g) and at = at(α
∗
t , βa, βb, γ), bt = bt(α
∗
t , βa, βb, γ).
Then by the envelope property (∂St∂at
∂at
∂αt
+ ∂St∂bt
∂bt
∂αt
= 0) we have, for any parameter
µ = βa, βb, γ
∂S∗t
∂µ
=
∂St
∂at
∂at
∂µ
+
∂St
∂bt
∂bt
∂µ
= (f − ∂C
∂at
)
∂at
∂µ
+ (g − ∂C
∂bt
)
∂bt
∂µ
= (f − [αt + βa])
∂at
∂µ
+ (g − βb)
∂bt
∂µ
(by agent’s Fob)
= (−γ [βb − g])
∂at
∂µ
+ (g − βb)
∂bt
∂µ
(by optimal αt)
= [g − βb]
µ
γ
∂at
∂µ
+
∂bt
∂µ
¶
From equation (3.1b)(the agent’s second first-order condition) we have
0 = Cba
∂at
∂βa
+ Cbb
∂bt
∂βa
= Cbb
µ
γ
∂at
∂βa
+
∂bt
∂βa
¶
1 = Cba
∂at
∂βb
+ Cbb
∂bt
∂βb
= Cbb
µ
γ
∂at
∂βb
+
∂bt
∂βb
¶
.
Hence we can conclude
∂S∗t
∂βa
= 0 and
∂S∗t
∂βb
= [g − βb]
1
Cbb
= [g − (Rq + gRy)(ho − f)]
1
Cbb
.
A.6. Joint vs. sole responsibility
Note that
RSy =
∂
∂y
E
¡
η | y21, q1
¢
= lim
σ2z→∞
RJy =
hσ2ησ
2
q
h2σ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2η + σ2yσ2q
RSq =
∂
∂q
E
¡
η | y21, q1
¢
= lim
σ2z→∞
RJq =
σ2ησ
2
y
h2σ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2η + σ2yσ2q
RJy =
∂
∂y
E (η | x1) =
hσ2ησ
2
zσ
2
q
h2σ2ησ2zσ2q + σ2yσ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2zσ2η + σ2yσ2zσ2q
RJq =
∂
∂q
E (η | x1) =
σ2ησ
2
yσ
2
z
h2σ2ησ2zσ2q + σ2yσ2ησ2q + σ2yσ2zσ2η + σ2yσ2zσ2q
.
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These expressions verify the claims leading to the relation βJb1 < β
S
b1 .
To further analyze the diﬀerence in (4.1), consider the expression
S∗J − S∗S = 2(g − 1
2
βJ)βJ − (g − 1
2
βS)βS +
(f − γg)2
1− γ2 −
1
2
f2
We see that the contour for S∗J −S∗S = 0 is a hyperbola in βJ , βS−space, see the figure
for an illustration. The figure has x = βJ on the horizontal axis and y = βS on the
vertical axis. The relevant part of this space to consider is βcrit < βJ < βS. For βJ = βS
(along the diagonal) we have S∗J − S∗S < 0 only if βJ is suﬃciently large. (The right-
hand branch of the contour cuts the diagonal to the left of βJ = 2g if γ is not too small.
(S∗J −S∗S = (f−γg)2
1−γ2 −
1
2
f2 for βJ = βS = 2g.) The left-hand branch of the contour cuts
the line βJ = βcrit if and only if g > f . (For βJ = βcrit we have by definition of βcrit that
S∗J − S∗S = 1
2
f2 − (g − 1
2
βS)βS ≥ 1
2
(f2 − g2).) So for g > f there is an area between
βJ = βcrit and the left-hand part of the contour where S∗J − S∗S < 0.
These considerations verify the statements made in the proposition.
g = 2, γ = .6
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